Contemporary American Indian History

Early Contact: Diplomacy and Trade Relations

To most observers, it is undeniable that the Thanksgiving portrayals projected across Americana are decidedly inaccurate. From Currier and Ives prints to Charlie Brown feasting with smiling Native Americans, this notion has become so pervasive that today’s students know very little about the complex nature of Indian and colonial relations. In seminar it was discussed how this misconception has been propagated through various cultural representations such as the stoic, noble savage, the vanishing Indian, or the menacing barbarian. Such portrayals do violence to authentic Native America as it reduces the Indian experience to broad stereotypes that can easily be dismissed or marginalized as quaint or insignificant. Before these fallacies can be successfully put to rest, the competing viewpoints with regard to pre-1492 Native America must be understood.⁴ In one camp there is a tendency to view Indians as peacefully coexisting with their neighbors and their surroundings. From this perspective comes the “noble, vanishing Indian”, hapless victims of European exploitation, lacking any trace of agency. Yet the alternative extreme, armed with the distorted lens of presentism, rushes to the equally skewed perspective that Indians regularly engaged in violent acts, human sacrifice, and environmental devastation, as if this somehow suggests some level of hypocrisy. It is lamentable that this constructed interpretation often leads to justification for the indefensible original European view, which portrays Native Americans as “menacing barbarians” in need of rehabilitation meted out under the guise of civilization.

In order to eradicate these fallacious notions, it is important for students to appreciate the rich culture and society enjoyed by the continent’s indigenous peoples prior to European contact. Largely missing from most narratives are such aspects as Native American views on land ownership, sustainable living, and the individualistic nature of their societies. As is characteristic of many civilizations across history, especially those of European descent, some tribes lived in peace while others were at war numerous times throughout their existence. Yet divergent views of property ownership certainly contributed to the conflicts with European settlers. Many Native American peoples saw their relation to the earth not so much as possessors, but as inhabitants, and therefore served as stewards of the land. These views, when juxtaposed with the jarringly different European views that eventually led to the destabilization of tribal sovereignty, provide context for how this vision differed radically from the European perspective. Coming from a time not too far removed from feudalism, where land ownership was difficult to attain, colonists in the new world perceived property, namely land, as something to be possessed at any cost. This struggle for land came at a great cost, indeed.

Fostering a more realistic sense of American Indians is most helpful to the narrative. To better understand and dispel the erroneous notion of Native America in the intervening years after 1492, it is important to begin with an understanding of the central role the Indians played in the colonists’ physical and economic survival. According to Jace Weaver, “Indians of the Americas were engaged in diplomacy from the moment of first contact. Every parlay between Natives and Europeans was in some sense a diplomatic meeting, be it major or minor.”⁵ As traders showed up on their shores and lands with increasing regularity, Native Americans soon learned the intricacies of managing the relationship with their European business partners. For instance, while they were open to trade, their hospitality did not include extended European visits.

For the Europeans, it is quite possible that at first, technology played a major role in a skewed perception of strength. To be sure, the Indians were initially taken aback by the perceived superiority of European weaponry, but soon the Native Americans discovered that firepower lost its advantage if the shooter lacked accuracy, which most Europeans did.⁶ Moreover, taking into account the time constraints of reloading a musket versus a long bow, if the colonists had any technological advantage, it was slight at best. In fact, as John Smith was being captured, he disabled his pistol to hide that it lacked the range of an arrow. This parity of weaponry quickly leveled the playing field and greatly affected early diplomacy and trade, two seemingly separate forces which were inextricably interwoven.

As the fur trade became more lucrative, multiple colonizing empires converged on North America with an eye on building a powerful base of trade. In 1608, within a year of the founding of the British colony at Jamestown, the founding of New France increased Native American power in unexpected ways. As Allan Greer suggests, in the eyes of the Indians, the French came “not as conquering invaders, but as a new tribe negotiating a place for itself in the diplomatic webs of Native North America.”⁷ Both Iroquoian- and Algonquian-speaking nations quickly recognized the advantages of playing one European power against the other, avoiding a total commitment to either European power and thereby compelling those nations to compete for their attention like suitors pursuing the same beau. If either New France or the British colonists were to make any headway with their trade partners, both their knee and will would have to bend, to ensure they were obtaining a most favored status.⁸

Because the fur trade emanating from the Ohio River Valley was so vital to European economic interests, Indians, like the Iroquois, clearly had the upper hand. According to Anthony Wallace,

...the Six Nations were able to use the Ohio country as the fulcrum in a game of 

playing off one side against the other that kept both the French and British

perpetually off balance...In the summer of 1701 the Iroquois confederacy...made 

two treaties, almost simultaneously, at Albany [British center of operations] and

Montreal [French]. These treaties together inaugurated a new era of Iroquois

policy...that required of the Iroquois as much duplicity in diplomatic dealings with

the Europeans as was practiced towards them; its success is measured by

the fact that both the British and the French alternated constantly between the

conviction that the Iroquois were on their own side and the conviction that they had

turned to the enemy. In consequence, the basic policy of both French and British

toward the Iroquois was to secure Iroquois neutrality by making political and

economic concessions to them.⁹

The Iroquois Confederacy masterfully leveraged this “playoff system” pitting the Anglo versus French in disputes that played one side against the other. In doing so, they not only benefitted from the currying of favor from one side and then the other, but they could disrupt both sides from gaining any true dominance over the region. What was left was the “covenant chain,” an alliance forged between the Iroquois and the British settlers in 1677.¹⁰ Moreover, the Iroquois Confederacy, making sure to maintain strict control of trade in the region, jealously guarded their role as brokers between British suppliers on one side and their customers, the western tribes on the other.¹¹ These alliances were important to the power structure in the region. According to Alan Taylor,

By framing an alliance to control the east-west trade, the Montagnais, Algonkin, 

and Huron excluded and alienated the Five Nation Iroquois...Determined to take

trade goods, captives, and revenge, the Five Nation Iroquois frequently raided 

northward to afflict the Montagnais, Algonkin, and Huron – which hurt the French

trade...In making Indians friends, however, Europeans almost invariably made

other Indians their enemies. As their price of business and protection, the

Montagnais, Algonkin, and Huron expected the French to help them fight the Five

Nation Iroquois. Compelled to choose, the French embraced the northern alliance

and made southern enemies.¹²

These bonds, however, proved quite expensive to maintain. Even though the English thought themselves superior to the indigenous peoples,  the chain retained its strength only through maintaining the illusion of acceptance.¹³ Matters became rather complicated when the Indians, sensing their lower status, pressed for an audience with England’s King William III. To indulge such a request was fraught with peril and expense. Yet, in 1696, a cadre of Mohawk representatives were brought to London with the intent of dazzling them with a show of English might on all fronts, from culture to governance, and most certainly, firepower. However, on the heels of this excursion, came another Native American contingent receiving similar adulation in the courts at Paris and Versailles. According to Weaver, “England had to outdo its adversary in wooing the Iroquois.”¹⁴ From the astute management of these contending forces in the “beaver wars”, one can appreciate the degree of political power, and yes, agency, that the Native Americans possessed, a reality that their European counterparts failed to fully comprehend.

Perhaps the largest obstacle to harmonious relations was the prejudice of which both sides were guilty. According to Charles Mann, “ethnocentrism seems to be a near-universal human quality.”¹⁵ With greed, or at least self-interest, being a common human trait, then it is understandable that when the two sides first met, both sought the best outcome for themselves. Regrettably, in most cases, each party was blinded by its own perceived superiority, believing that it had the upper hand and could manage the negotiations to a successful, if decidedly one-sided, advantage. For instance, the British tended to look down upon Indians as primitive peoples. This arrogant outlook eventually alienated not just the native populations, but their own kin in the American colonies as well. And the Indian view of their English counterparts could be equally skewed. As Mann also illustrates, Native Americans perceived the English in the following way.

They were irritatingly garrulous, prone to fits of chancery, and often surprisingly

incompetent at what seemed to Indians like basic tasks. But they also made useful

and beautiful goods – copper kettles, glittering colored glass, and steel knives and

hatchets – unlike anything else in New England. Moreover, they would exchange

these valuable items for cheap furs of the sort used by Indians as blankets. It was

like happening upon a dingy kiosk that would swap fancy electronic goods for

customers’ used socks – almost anyone would be willing to overlook the

shopkeeper’s peculiarities.¹⁶

The superior attitude of the British also distracted them from the realities of commercial and political alliances. Rather than recognizing that they were not just entering into a business venture, but a political, and if need be, military, alliance, the British often tried to treat the interwoven motivations as separate, which was decidedly different than the Indian point of view. Taylor adds,

In Indian diplomacy, words were cheap and meaningless unless 

accompanied by the ceremonial delivery of valued presents. Because 

Europeans thought of trade as purely commercial and distinct from

diplomacy, they initially balked at the Indian notion that trade sealed an

alliance between equals...(Native Americans) learned never to trade with the

first vessel to come their way but to await several to compete for their furs.

The natives became adept at driving a hard bargain, to the dismay of the

Europeans, who preferred to think of Indians as perpetual children.”¹⁷

Although the access to European products such as textiles, metal tools and weapons, and, regrettably, alcohol, built a dependence among the Indians, it was the Europeans who became captives to this process.¹⁸ Once the Indians valued these trade goods, any decrease or cessation of trade was seen as a threat to Native American survival and therefore an act of war. Isolated as they were in this strange new land, and surrounded by alliances that were temporal and unstable at best, colonial settlers could ill afford to make enemies. They had little choice but to adhere to Native American trade practices. The entangling nature of alliances meant that not only were goods exchanged but military assistance as well. And once again, the native populations were first to the party and well in control of their destiny.

Alan Taylor places Native American history in a more informal perspective in surmising that “Instead of lurking beyond the colonies in a ‘wilderness,’ Indians have come back into the story as central and persistent protagonists...The biggest difference was the unprecedented mixing of radically diverse peoples – African, European, and Indian – under circumstances stressful for all of them.”¹⁹ Seen from the right perspective, in this new light of agency, one can appreciate the diplomatic skill employed by Native American peoples as they navigated the changing tides of the late seventeenth century.